The Hawk-Dove game is a two-player game-theoretic micro-model that can be used to investigate the evolution of cooperative behaviour in many-agent systems. Individual agents have a stochastic strategy in the form of a continuous-valued probability of playing a non-cooperative "hawk" strategy and a large system of agents is formulated on various spatial grids of different dimensionalities and sizes of neighbourhoods. We investigate the approach of the spatial Hawk-Dove game towards a well-mixed equilibrium state as the player interaction neighbourhood size is increased. We explore metrics for assessing the closeness of the system to being well-mixed and compare results from numerical simulations with theoretical predictions for a well-mixed system, where spatial isolation effects ought to be irrelevant.
Introduction
Game theoretic models [2, 13] arise in a number of contexts including physical [5] and sociological systems [3] as well as in biological systems. Experimental work of real biological systems can sometimes be compared directly with predictions. The best way to explore such predictions and test them is often to compare them with numerical simulations of appropriate model systems under suitable parametric control. In this paper we explore the model parameter space of the Hawk-Dove game when played on various spatial geometries, dimensions and sizes of player interaction neighbourhood.
A spatial agent system [24] can be simulated using many individual agents arranged at particular (fixed) positions, whereby each one interacts with only a localised subset of the total number of agents. Game theory [18, 21] makes various predictions concerning the cooperative behaviour of agents interacting in a well-mixed spatial system [16] . Cooperation [1, 10, 17] is an important trait in agent-based system and the study of the emergence [20] or suppression of cooperation in a complex system of many independent agents is an important area of study for biological and other systems. Two of the better known game theoretic models used in areas such as biological models are the Prisoners' Dilemma [15] and the Snowdrift Game [4] . These normally consist of players with either pure strategies such as "always cooperate" or "always defect", or mixed strategies whereby players adapt their behaviours according to their environment. The Hawk-Dove game has a similar two-player payoff matrix structure as these games, but it is often formulated in terms of probabilistic player tendencies rather than as fixed players that always employ the same pure strategies of cooperation or aggression. Figure 1 shows a typical spatial pattern of hawks (red) and doves( blue) on a system of size 50 3 that has been well equilibrated.
The Prisoner's Dilemma system has an evolutionarily stable [19] non-cooperative state but is known to exhibit enhanced cooperation that persists as localised pockets of cooperating agents against a background of defectors [26] on square lattice. The Snowdrift game is known however not to support this notion in general and the favoured spatial pattern in low-dimensional systems is known to be relatively small and dendritic spatial groups of cooperating agents. Agents thus form spatial niches [25] in both models but with quite different spatial structures, dictated by the prevailing competitive advantages of agent behaviours in the model systems. The Hawk-Dove game played with the probabilistic tendency strategies employed here also appears to exhibit this same trait. Depending upon the relative advantage of aggression (defection) hawks form small clumps against a sea of doves or vice versa. Even at the tipping-point of the cost-benefit parameter the spatial structures of hawks or doves are never dense in extent and appear to maximise surface area with the opposing agent species.
Understanding the role of space and geometry in game agent systems [8] is important as it affects how these niches of cooperative or other agent behaviours form and persist. Prior work has reported on the systemic changes in emergent spatial structures in systems of Prisoner Dilemma game agents [6] and pure strategy Snowdrift game agents [9] . In this present work we focus solely on the probabilistic strategy Hawk-Dove game agent model.
Replicator dynamics [11] and population theory [14] indicate that the equilibrium density of cooperator agents should tend towards 1 − r in a well-mixed system, where r is the ratio of cost to benefit for the players as a whole. Hauert and Doebell have explored this [4] for a range of small neighbourhood sizes and their results imply that spatial structure does not necessarily lead to enhanced cooperative behaviour.
In this present work we extend their results to look at higher dimensional systems and a considerably larger range of spatial game player neighbourhood inclusion sizes. We explore the limiting behaviour towards the suggested theoretical prediction and find that it can be achieved with relatively small model systems. We use a systematic set of increasing neighbourhood sizes we also show that the spatial Hawk-Dove model with probabilistic strategies the system as a whole approaches this limit independently of both the system dimension and of the exact geometrical details.
Our article is structured as follows: We define and develop the notation and terminology for the spatial game agent models in Section 2, including parameterisations of the game-playing agent payoff matrix. In Section 3 we describe the computational experiments used to study the approach to states of well-mixed equilibria. We give both visual and quantitative results in Section 4. We discuss the implications for spatial game agent models with differing localities in Section 5 and offer some conclusions and ideas for future study in Section 6.
Game Theoretic Terminology
Two-player game-theoretic models [22] are usually formulated in terms of a 2 × 2 payoff matrix, giving the numerical outcomes for both players for each of the four combinations of cooperation/defection.
The total payoff matrix for both players (as a combined system) is generally written as:
where player 1 options are the rows and player 2 options are the columns so the overall system payoff if both players cooperate is R 1 + R 2 . The Hawk-Dove game is conceived as a meeting between two agents who can play one of the two possible strategies -they can be doves which cooperate with other doves; or they can be hawks who initiate aggression with the other player. When two doves meet they both cooperate and both receive reward R. When a hawk meets a dove agent, the dove flees receiving nothing S = 0 while the hawk receives a tangible amount T -imagined in terms of food or conceded territory for example. When two hawks meet however they will fight and will both lose some health or fitness and will thus receive the numerical punishment amount P .
The usual definition for the Hawk and Dove model is for:
The Hawk-Dove game can be analysed in terms of the two parameters benefit β and loss γ and with:
and for simplicity we explore cases where:
to ensure 2 It is thus convenient to reformulate the Hawk-Dove model in terms of a single useful parameter: the loss benefit ratio r: r = β γ (6) so that by fixing eg β = 1 and varying γ we can do an experimental scan across the spectrum of values of interest of the model. Since scaling the terms does not affect the game agent behaviour it is therefore simpler to adopt this approach and deal with a single adjustable parameter r. These agent game models thus define how an individual microscopic agent can play the appropriate game against another player and what will ensue depending upon the strategy played at that particular meeting or time-step of the simulation.
There are many different game playing strategies that have been considered but for our purposes in this present work we consider a spatial arrangement of game playing . agents that have probabilistic strategies -at each game step a uniform pseudo random number is used to determine stochastically what strategy each agent plays. In a sense each agent is defined by its hawkish tendency -as characterised by a continuous probability. This will be realised into a definite hawk or dove stance adopted at each timestep against each agent it plays against.
The nature of the spatial game system is that we consider a large number of such agents, arranged for example on a grid or in some other geometric configuration. At each time step an agent plays the game directly against all of its neighbouring agents and so obtains a total payoff amount from these games. Once the payoffs have been computed a mechanism is introduced so that the agent copies the strategy of a neighbouring agent that has the highest payoff. In the case of the hawk-dove game, we adopt the common approach reported in the literature of allowing a small probability P m of strategy mutation to a close "nearby" strategy given by p + ξ where ξ is a Gaussian districted random variable. We of course ensure that 0 <= p <= 1 strictly.
This mechanism allows the system to properly explore its states and for it to achieve a dynamic equilibrium that depends on r but not on the initial spatial mix of hawkish tendencies seeded. We initialise agents with a Gaussian distribution around some chosen initial hawkish tendency p h .
Typically agent systems can be updated synchronously (all at once) or asynchronously , by stepping through the system in a random order and updating in situ. For the work reported in this paper we focus on simple synchronous updates where every agent is updated exactly once at each time-step.
Various authors have identified mechanisms for the agent strategy propagation. A common approach adopted [4] is to use a weighting function with a small noise term κ so that at each time step the focal agent adopts the strategy of a randomly chosen neighbour with probability:
where δz is the difference between the total payoff amounts earned by the focal agent and its neighbour. Setting κ = 0.1 provides a small but sufficient noise term to prevent agent species from accidentally becoming completely extinct during the simulation, and is the approach adopted by many researchers using similar models. Several authors have argued that a small noise term does in fact present a more realistic scenario for comparisons with experimental data than would a completely noiseless system. We have found that the system equilibrium values are not sensitive to the value of κ although the simulation time to reach equilibrium is. Too small a noise value means a species can become extinct due to finite size effects.
Computational Experiments
We developed a customised simulation code in the C++ programming language for this work. This uses a pre-
identify cost-benefit ratio r and hence payoff matrix identify geometry, dimension, neighbourhood size |N | for 10 independent jobs do initialize N agents' hawkish tendencies
viously developed and tested library of geometry generating algorithms [7] and allows us to experiment with hexagonal, triangular and hyper-cubic lattice systems in arbitrary dimensions and also to experiment with different sizes of neighbourhoods, including simple nearest neighbour (eg 4 in 2D, 6 in 3D); Moore neighbourhoods (eg 8 in 2D, 26 in 3D) and generalised spherical inclusion parameterised by a radius. The procedure for the computational experiments is outlined in Algorithm 1.
For simplicity we used a fixed value of β = 1 and varied the cost-benefit ratio r from 0 to 1. We experimented with several different neighbourhood size |N | that arose from different geometries and dimensions of system as well as from using different hyper-spherical radial inclusion distances.
A most useful property that can be measured for spatial agent systems is the density of cooperator agent plays ρ C . In the Hawk-Dove model agents have a probabilistic hawkish tendency, but we can track the number of actual plays made and record if they were cooperating dove moves or not. We initialise our model system with a Gaussian random pattern of hawkish tendencies about a mean value of eg 0.5 and observe the system evolve according to the microscopic game playing rules. Depending upon the cost benefit ratio cooperation diminishes or thrives and we measure ρ C (t) as a function of simulation time t.
If we vary the spatial dimension d = 2, 3, 4, 5 then for a hyper-cubic geometrical mesh system of agents we obtain the number of neighbours |N | as 4, 6, 8, 10 respectively for a strictly nearest-neighbour neighbourhood and 8, 26, 80, 242 respectively for a Moore neighbourhood definition. If we use a radial inclusion distance of rad =  2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 , ... we obtain an even wider range of ex-. perimental |N | values. A hexagonal lattice gives each agent 3 neighbours and a triangular lattice 6 neighbours [12] . We use prism geometry to extend these to their 3D equivalents.
Well-Mixed Hawks & Doves
We need to study the stable equilibrated values of ρ C and so it is important to understand how long the randomly initialised spatial agent system will typically take to reach a dynamic equilibrium for various values of the cost-benefit control parameter r. Figure 2 shows the time traces of the cooperator density fraction for the Hawk-Dove game system. The system is seen to reach a reasonably steady dynamical equilibrium after around 2000 time-steps. We equilibrate for 2000 steps, before measuring < ρ C > over a subsequent 1000 time-steps. We further average these results over ten independently seeded runs to obtain experimental uncertainty estimates -although for the work reported here, error bars on the plots are typically smaller than the plot symbols used.
It is also useful to visualise the mix of agents in the system as it evolves and also once it is equilibrated. Figure 3 shows step 210 in the equilibration of a 40 3 agent system. Colours in a rainbow from red to blue are used to denote the probabilistic tendency of the agents. As is traditional in the game theory literature, we use red to denote hawkish aggression or defection and blue to denote cooperation. Not that in this model there is a continuous spectrum of tendencies present in the system, although at any given game play an agent will choose a definite cooperate(dove)/defect(hawk) action. We show typical patterns of actual hawk/dove plays in Figure 4 which displays five snapshots of well-equilibrated 100 2 systems at values of r = 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1. As can be seen the spatial structure of the minority agent are typically small and dendritic in nature -maximising the surface area with the competing species. Step 210 as a 40 3 system at r = 0.5 moves towards equilibrium. We can histogram the spectrum of hawkish tendencies present in the system at any given time. Figure 5 shows the mix present in equilibrated 3D systems for three different values of r = 0, 0.5, 1. Since the hawkish tendency is a probability it is constrained to be strictly 0 < p < 1 and we see this in the plotted distributions -they are approximately normal in shape but are flattened at the upper and lower extrema.
We define a range of the cost-benefit parameter r = 0, 0.02, ..., 0.98, 0.1 over which to obtain a scan of experimental equilibrium values of ρ C . Figure 6 shows typical measurements of ρ C over this range. The theoretical prediction for a well mixed system 180 . Figure 4 . Snapshot of an equilibrated configurations of a 100
2 Hawk(red)-Dove(blue) system with γ = {1, 1.333, 2, 12, 50}, left to right. Figure 6 . Measured equilibrium values of cooperator density ρ C = 1 − r is drawn in as a straight line. As can be seen the actual system departs from this theoretical line in an interesting manner. It saturates at both low and high values of the cost benefit ratio but is also significantly different at the mid range too. The system however becomes closer and closer to the well-mixed theoretical prediction as the neighbourhood size |N | is increased. We can identify the departures from the theoretical prediction by plotting the differences explicitly. Figure 7 shows typical measurements of the departure from theoretical prediction: ρ C − (1 − r) over the range of experimental r values. The departure is extreme for low and high r and there is an interesting crossover around r ≈ 0.2. Above this value the theory for a well-mixed system generally over-predicts the experimental measured values from the simulations.
We can define quantitative metrics for how well the system has approached a state of well-mixedness with varying neighbourhood size |N |.
A simple metric is to plot the difference in the midpoint value around r = 0.5. This mid-point difference M D Figure 7 . Measured equilibrium values of cooperator density with the well-mixed theoretical predicted value subtracted off ρ C − (1 − r) plotted against the cost-benefit ratio r for various dimensions and neighbourhood sizes of simulated Hawk-Dove system. is seen to vary approximately as:
where the fitted values are accurate to ±0.02 and are seemingly independent of dimension. Another metric, which takes into account departure over the whole r range, is the sum of the square of the differences from ρ c predicted and measured values. This is smoother and more regularly monotonic with |N | but is less easily characterised by a simple functional fit. Figure 8 shows the least squares and mid-point metrics plotted against log of neighbourhood size |N |. There is a obvious convergence with rising |N | albeit with departures from monotonicity due to different dimensionalities.
Discussion
Our findings support the comments of Hauert and Doebell [4] that in the spatial Hawk-Dove game the localisation of playoffs does not necessarily lead to enhanced
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. cooperation (dove like behaviour). The spatial structures in both the 3D and 2D systems are largely sparse and dendritic and unlike those in the Prisoners' Dilemma spatial model where cooperators clump together in dense structures to minimise the defensive line against defectors.
However we have seen that despite a wide range of geometries, differing dimensions, and neighbourhood sizes, the minority agent strategy still persists even in a majority of the opposing strategy.
The neighbourhood size seems to be the dominant parameter in the approach to a well-mixed system of agents. The larger the neighbourhood the more well-mixed behaviour is exhibited. The spatial geometrical details do not seem to play a large part directly. There is a small effect as seen by the departures from monotonicity in the curves of figure 8 however.
Unlike in other models [23] the spatial Hawk-Dove model does not seem to have a critical dimension between d = 2, 3. It remains to eperiment with higher dimensional systems such as 4 and 5 dimensions.
The model seems insensitive to the exact initialisation fraction of hawks/doves. Providing there is a non-zero mutation probability when strategies are potentially copied, the model seems able to explore its state space and find a systematic dynamical equilibrium value for ρ C eventually. We have investigated various noise parameters and found they do not affect the equilibrium values, but they do affect the number of simulation steps required to reach equilibria. We have been somewhat subjective in our assessment of when dynamic equilibria has been reached. For the data presented here we have been over cautious and have run the system for longer than strictly necessary to remove any system memory of the initial agent configurations.
Conclusion
We have developed fast numerical simulation software to explore the spatial Hawk-Dove game on a wide range of lattice geometries, dimensions and agent interaction neighbourhood sizes. We find that suitably equilibrated systems approach theoretical predictions fro a wellmixed system nearly monotonically with neighbourhood
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. size -independent of microscopic topological and geometry details.
We find the minority agent species form relatively small and dendritic structures against the bulk of the majority species at equilibrium. The system is not completely symmetric about cost benefit ration r = 0.5 although this is a good place for making perturbation theory comparisons.
Our work indicates that strategy mutation noise speeds up the equilibration and make it insensitive to initial conditions, but otherwise does not seem to affect the equilibrium values found from the simulations. The reported noise values are therefore likely useful starting points for simulation work studying other similar gametheoretic models.
There is scope for studying considerably more sophisticated mixed strategies instead of just the stochastic hawkish tendencies modelled as probabilities. Mixed strategies could incorporate player memories and environmental information such as the strategy reputations of particular agents. Our agents were stationery, but it would also be feasible to incorporate movement or diffusion so that specific agents move around, encountering a wider selection of (non-local) players against which to evolve playoff strategies.
In fields such as biology, game-agent models are useful but it can be difficult to find isolatable real systems with which direct experiments can be made. Spatial agent model simulations are likely to continue to be useful in comparing theoretical predictions with numerical experimental values which can act as a bridge between experiment and theory in such complex systems.
